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Court affirmied the Water Master's lindings that the two portions of the creek
did not constitute separate sources.
Finally, the Court addressed Marks's abandonment argument. To support this contention, Marks relied on the sane evidence he had provided for
his first assertion. Specificaly, he used the water commissioner's reports of
insufficient water flow to claim that Rankin and Galt failed to beneficially use
their rights. From this argument, Marks drew the conclusion that Rankin and
Galt had eflectively abandoned their rights by allowing them to lie dormant for
over twenty years. Relying on the previous decision that, standing alone, the
water commissioner records failed to prove non-use, the Court determined
that Marks's argument for abandonment failed.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Water Court's dismissal of Marks's
objection.
Kaly Riankin

NEBRASKA
Weber v. N. Loup River Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 854 N.W.2d 263
(Neb. 2014) (holding that the district court properly granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment because (i) the plaintifl's' failure to pay irrigation charges was a condition precedent to the defendant's contractual duty to
deliver water to the plaintiffs' land; (ii) the defendant did not waive the condition precedent when it waived tie irrigation fees for one newly-contracted tract
of land; (iii) the defendant did not anticipatorily breach the contracts because
the plaintiffs had already materially breached the contract through nonpayment; and (iv) the defendant was not negligent in its delivery of tie water to
the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs' prior breach of the contracts relieved the
defendant of any preexisting duty).
North Loup River Public Power and Irrigation District ("North Loup")
manages an irrigation system with many diversion dams and canals, including
the Taylor-Ord Canal ("Canal"), which originates at the Taylor Diversion
Dam ("Dam"). William and Dixie Weber ("the Webers") held eight contracts with North Loup to irrigate their farmland from the Canal. The contracts stated that North Loup would provide water during the irrigation season
to the Webers' land for $2.50 per acre. The Webers were to pay for their water by the first of December the year preceding the irrigation season. The
contracts also stated that North Loup would withhold delivery of the water if
the Webers failed to pay within four months of that date.
In June 2010 the North Loup River experienced an uncommon anount
of rainfall and flooding. On June 11, 2010, the flood completely destroyed
the Dam and severely damaged the Canal. North Loup determined that the
Dam was "beyond repair" and decided to rebuild a permanent dam. The
landowners with contracts for irrigation water received no water that year due
to the damnage.
The Webers' bill for the 2010 irrigation season was due December 1,
2009. At the time of the flood in June 2010, the Webers still had not paid
their bill. The Webers finally paid their bill on April 13, 2011, but they did so
"under protest." In December 2011 the Webers filed a complaint against
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North Loup alleging that North Loup had breached its contracts with them
and negligently failed to provide water during the 2010 irrigation season.
North Loup denied the allegations and asserted that the Webers had failed to
fulfill a condition precedent of the contracts when they failed to pay the 2010
irrigation charges until April 13, 2011. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court for Loup County ("district court") granted North Loup's motion
for summary judgment, concluding that the Webers breached a condition
precedent, thereby relieving North Loup of its duty to deliver water. The
Webers appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Nebraska ("Court").
On appeal, the Webers claimed that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to North Loup because issues of material fact existed regarding the Webers' obligation to make an advanced payment for the 2010
irrigation season. Accordingly, the Webers claimed, North Loup anticipatorily breached its contract. The Court clarified that the "meaning of an unambiguous contract is a question of law."
The Court applied general contract principles to the Webers' contract. In
doing so, the Court first considered whether the Webers' payment of irrigation charges was a condition precedent to North Loup's contractual duty to
deliver water. Holding that it was, the Court found a condition in the terms of
the contract that stated, "INorth Loupi shall withhold and stop the delivery of
water to the landowner in the event a default of payments herein required occurs and such default continues for a period of four months following the due
date." The Webers did not deny that they failed to pay their bill when due on
December 1, 2009. Further, the Webers admitted that their bill continued to
be in default for much longer than four months after the due date. Therefore,
the Court reasoned that North Loup's duty to provide water "never came to
fruition," negating the possibility of breach.
The Court further held that North Loup did not waive the condition
precedent. The Webers argued that North Loup never decided whether it
would waive the landowners' 2010 irrigation charges due to the flood. Noting
that waiver of a condition precedent requires a clear, unequivocal, and decisive action, the Court held that North Loup did not waive the condition precedent to the Webers' contract. Although North Loup waived a different
landowner's irrigation charges in the 2010 year, the Court found that North
Loup did so because the contract was only formed two months prior to the
flood. The Court concluded that North Loup's isolated wavier of the other
landowner's irrigation fees did not waive the condition precedent in its contract with the Webers.
The Court next considered whether North Loup anticipatorily breached
the contracts. The Webers argued that North Loup anticipatorily breached
the contracts when it decided to build a new dan rather than a temporary one,
without an assessment of damages two months before the irrigation season.
The Court disagreed and held that North Loup did not anticipatorily breach
the contracts. The Court reasoned that the Webers breached the contracts
before North Loup's alleged breach. Because payment of the 2010 irrigation
fees was both the Webers' duty to perform and a condition precedent to
North Loup's duty to provide water, North Loup could not anticipatorily
breach the contracts when the Webers had already materially breached them.
The Court emphasized that the term was material because the Webers' pay-
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ment was one of their only obligations under the contracts.
Finally, the Court held that North Loup (lid not act negligently by Failing
to deliver water to the Webers, even though non-delivery of the water might
have been a statutory violation. Nebraska Revised Statutes section 46-263
makes it a misdemeanor for a person in charge "of a ditch or canal used for
Irrigation puirposes... to prevent or interfere with the proper delivery of water
to the person or persons having the right thereto." North Loup argued that
the statute was inapplicable because it applied to "persons" and not to "public
"entities." The Court did not address whether the statute applied to "public
entities," instead linding that the statute did not require North Loup to deliver
water to "those having no right to the water." The Court held that the Webers' nonpayment of the irrigation fees relieved North Loup of itsdtity to deliver water. Because North Loup had no duty to deliver the water at all, the
Court found that North Loup's failure to deliver the water was not negligent.
Accordingly, the Court alfinned die district court's grant of North Loup's
motion for summary judgment.
Kylie lVvse

WYOMING
Plait v. Platt, 337 P.3d 431 (Wyo. 2014) (holding the district court's order
to partition in kind a ranch property, including the water rights appurtenant to
the individual parcels, through construction of a separate ditch to carry water
from one parcel to the other, was incomplete and clearly erroneous because
the record lacked competent evidence to establish that the ditch requirement
would not manifestly injure the value of the property).
Ralph E. Platt, Wayne W. Platt, and appellant Alice A. Platt ("Alice"), inherited their family ranch near Encampment, Wyoming. The Platt brothers
eventually placed their half of the ranch in the Platt Ranch Trust (die "Trust"),
one of the appellees in this case. Disagreenents concerning the operation of
the ranch led the parties to seek partition in kind from the District Court of
Carbon County, Wyoming ("district court"). Finding the parties were entitled
to partition, the district court appointed three commissioners to detennine an
equitable division of the land and water rights. The commissioners proposed
a division of the land that the parties accepted, and additionally recommended
allocation of the water rights to the parcels of land to which they were appurtenant.
In Wyoming, "[wlater rights can be partitioned along with the real property to which they pertain, provided that each parcel receives an equitable share
of the right and has enough water to permit continued use of the land as it has
historically been used." Historically, the Platt's irrigated the ranch by drawing
water from the King Tumbull Ditch No. 2 located on the neighboring Kraft
ranch, and then sending it through the North-South Ditch to flood-irrigate the
Trust's parcel. They recaptured the remaining water to irrigate Alice's parcel.
Because this system depended on a single water right, the commissioners determined that a ditch, headgate, and measuring device were necessary to meter
and distinguish Alice's water from the Trust's. Accordingly, the commissioners reconnended establishing a "Dedicated Ditch" to separately carry Alice's

